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Annulments - A Comparative Study of
jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Decrees
I. INTRODUCTION
AN ANNULMENT is not the usual decree sought when dissolu-
tion of a marriage is desired. This is evidenced by the dispro-
portionate number of divorce decrees rendered as opposed to nullity
decrees.' Various explanations might be tendered to explain why
nullity decrees are in such lesser demand. The obvious explanation
is that the generally recognized grounds for annulment2 such as big-
amy, incapacity, willful refusal to consummate, and consanguinity,
occur much less frequently than do normal grounds for the break-
down of marriages. Another explanation is the conceptual difficulty
presented by the definition of annulment. A divorce terminates an
existing marriage whereas an annulment declares that the parties
were never legally married. The conceptual difficulty arises when two
persons have been living together for a period of time subsequent
to a ceremony and a decree is rendered to the effect that their mar-
riage never existed.3 Finally, the similarity of effect on the parties'
status resulting from a divorce or nullity decree, coupled with the
historically more definite and extensive jurisdiction of the divorce
courts, might be a factor in making a divorce more desirable.4  Rec-
ognition of this similarity has led some states to provide that jurisdic-
tional requirements be the same for annulment and divorce actions.'
1 Disparate statistics are found regarding the ratio of annulments to divorces in the
United States. One estimate is to the effect that annulments constituted three percent
of marriage dissolutions in the 1950's. P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 90 (1959). Vernon, Labyrinthine Ways: jurisdiction to Annul, 10 J. PUB. L.
47, 48 (1961), notes that in the United States for every annulment approximately 137
divorces are granted. It is assumed that similar proportions obtain in the other jurisdic-
tions to be considered in this Note.
2 For a complete listing of the grounds for annulment in England see W. RAYDEN,
PRACTICE AND LAW OF DIVORCE 362-63 (10th ed. J. Jackson 1967). An extended dis-
cussion of grounds recognized in the various states of the United States is contained in
Vernon, Annulment of Marriages in New Mexico: Part II - Proposed Statute, 2 NAT.
REs. J. 270 (1962). Those recognized in Australia are discussed in P. JOSKE, MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE 171-80 (4th ed. 1963, Supp. 1966).
3 An interesting protrayal of this problem is made in Storke, Annulment in the Con-
flict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1959).
4 It has been argued that jurisdiction over a nullity action should be exercised only if
the state in which the court sat was also the place of the celebration of the marriage or
the domicile of the parties at the time of the marriage. See Goodrich, Jurisdiction to, An-
nul a Marriage, 32 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1919). This position was criticized by McMur-
ray & Cunningham, Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a Marriage Celebrated in Another
State or Foreign Country, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 105, 111 (1930), who argued that "there
is no reasonable justification for denying relief on a theory that only one country or state
must have exclusive power. There is room for action by several states."
5 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-604 (1961); MAss. GEN'L LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 14
ANNULMENTS
Nonetheless, annulments are presently a distinct aspect of domestic
relations law and the problems which arise in this area must be dealt
with accordingly.' This Note will outline the bases of jurisdiction
over nullity actions in England, Scotland, Canada, Australia, and
the United States. In addition, it will depict these countries' posi-
tions with respect to the recognition of foreign nullity decrees.
To facilitate understanding of the ensuing discussion, a terminol-
ogical foundation must be laid. Any marriage which would be sub-
ject to a nullity decree is classified as either "void" or "voidable."7
Historically, civil impediments such as prior marriage and mental
illness rendered a marriage void, while canonical impediments such
as consanguinity, affinity, and impotence rendered a marriage void-
able." This distinction was based on the differences in jurisdiction
of the English ecclesiastical courts and the common law and chan-
cery courts?
Today, however, it is generally recognized that a marriage is void
from its inception for lack of form or age, consanguinity, affinity,
bigamy, or the certified lunacy of either party at the time of the
marriage.'0 A petition for an annulment of a void marriage attacks
(1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.03 (1969). See also Grodecki, Recent Developments
in Nullity Jurisdiction, 20 MOD. L. REV. 566 (1957), who argues that England should
do likewise.
6 The argument has been advanced that nullity actions should be equivalent to di-
vorce actions in all respects. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 143 (1968). Vernon, supra note 2, at 276, argues that the element of
social stigma which attaches to divorce is sufficient justification for keeping the remedies
separate. Storke, supra note 3, at 871-72, observes that such an equivalence might
provide too much recognition to bigamous marriages, and also that large groups of per-
sons are opposed to divorce on religious grounds.
7 H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 120; J. JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE 80-81 (1969). For a lucid description and delineation of void and void-
able marriages, see the discussion in De Reneville v. De Reneville, [1948] P. 100, 111
(C.A.). The definitions given there are accepted in all of the jurisdictions under study.
8 A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAW 347 (8th ed. J. Morris ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as DICEY & MORRIS]. Speca, The Development of Jurisdiction in
Annulment of Marriage Cases, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 109, 110-11 (1954).
9 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, state that:
[T)he ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over canonical impedi-
ments (e.g., consanguinity, affinity and impotence), while the common law
and chancery courts as well as the ecclesiastical courts could treat a marriage
as a nullity because of a civil impediment (e.g., prior marriage, lack of age,
lunacy, etc.). Since the common law courts would interfere by writ of pro-
hibition to prevent the ecclesiastical courts from exercising their exclusive ju-
risdiction to annul a marriage after the death of one of the parties, the essence
of the distinction [between void and voidable marriages) came to be that a
voidable marriage could only be annulled during the parties' joint lives. Id.
at 347.
10 These are more akin to the distinct defects as recognized in English domestic law.
DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 346. See also Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, §§ 18,
21 (Austl.). In the United States, however, such a broad statement is not accurate.
Some states declare bigamy to be a ground for divorce as does Canada. In Ohio, non-
age has been indicated to be more appropriately classified as constituting a voidable
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the form or validity of the ceremony itself. The remark is often
made that a void marriage can be treated by the parties as never hav-
ing taken place, even in the absence of a judicial declaration." Thus
a nullity decree of a void marriage merely declares that no marriage
has ever existed.'
A voidable marriage has been recognized as a union entailing
less serious defects." Incapacity and refusal to consummate are
generally considered to be such defects.' 4 However, in a voidable
marriage - as opposed to a void marriage - if a decree of annul-
ment is not obtained, the presumption is that the marriage is valid. 5
The effect of a nullity decree on a voidable marriage 6 has tradi-
tionally been to declare that the decree relates back to the ceremony
and hence the marriage never existed.'" In reality though, it has
been recognized that "in its effect on the personal status of the
spouses the annulment of a voidable marriage has the same effect as
the dissolution of a valid marriage.... 1,,8
Whether actions to annul voidable marriages should be com-
pletely equivalent to divorce actions is beyond the scope of this Note.
The purpose here will be to outline the bases of jurisdiction in the
different common law countries. When the similarities and differ-
ences have been compared, however, conclusions may be drawn re-
garding the advisability of identical bases of jurisdiction.
marriage in light of the statute of limitations imposed on the cause of action. 16 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 915,920 n. 2 4 (1965) [formerly W. RES. L. REV.).
11 See, e.g., Grodecki, supra note 5, at 567. It has been asked why the parties even
bother obtaining a judicial decree if this definition is truly correct. One answer is that a
person has a right to a judicial declaration when there is a legal defect in his marriage.
Another answer is that the mere occurrence of the ceremony creates expectations and re-
liance by the public, hence a court declaration is merely for the convenience of these
domestic connections. P. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 83-84.
12 H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 120-21. Decrees annulling void marriages are some-
times referred to as "declaratory." A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 300 (1962);
Storke, supra note 3, at 850.
13 Storke, supra note 3, at 850.
14 Again, the generalization is more applicable in English domestic law. DICEY &
MORRIS, supra note 8, at 346. In Australia, for example, willful refusal to consummate
is a ground for divorce. P. JOSKE, supra note 2, at 181, 361.
15 H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 121.
11 This decree has been classified as "constitutive." A. EHRENZWIEG, supra note 12,
at 301; McMurray & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 112.
17 H. CLARK, supra note 6, at 121; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 347-48;
Storke, supra note 3, at 851.
18 ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE REPORT CMD. No. 9678
(1956), cited in Mann, The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce: Jurisdiction
of the English Courts and Recognition of Foreign Decrees, 21 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13
(1958).
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II. JURISDICTION
A. England
For centuries the English ecclesiastical courts exercised juris-
diction over nullity actions, treating them without regard to whether
a marriage was void or voidable.'9 "Their jurisdiction was exercised
pro salute animae - for the sake of the souls of the parties who
were before the courts."2 °  Nonetheless, the distinction was at that
time clearly embedded in the law.2' In 1857, the jurisdiction pre-
viously exercised by the ecclesiastical courts in divorce suits and nul-
lity actions was transferred to the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes. 2 In addition to the jurisdiction previously exercised by the
ecclesiastical courts, the newly established divorce courts were also
vested with jurisdictional powers expressly conferred by the statute.
The first jurisdictional issue presented to the new court was the
case of Simonin v. Mallac.2" In Simonin both parties were domiciled
in Paris and over 21 years of age. Unable to obtain parental con-
sent to marry (required by the Code Napol6on), they came to En-
gland to have the ceremony performed. Upon solemnisation, they
returned to Paris but thereafter never cohabited. The wife sought
and obtained from the French court a decree declaring the marriage
void. Subsequently she came to reside in England. Unsure of her
status in that country she sought a decree of nullity from the En-
glish court. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the mat-
ter because the parties, "by professing to enter into a contract in
England, mutually gave to each other the right to have the force and
effect of that contract determined by an English tribunal."24  It
19 See Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith, [1962] 1 All E.R. 344, 350 (H.L.) and Gower
v. Starrett, [19481 2 D.L.R. 853, 860 where these courts have reviewed the historical
development of void and voidable marriages. See also DIcEY & MoRRIs, supra note 8,
at 348.
20 Padolecchia v. Padolecchia, 11968) P. 314, 327 (1967). The opinion presents
a rather complete discussion of the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction. Id. 327-30.
21 Id. at 329. The distinction, however, was apparently real only to the judiciary,
as the ecclesiastical courts did not pay much attention to it. Lord Morris in Ross-
Smith v. Ross-Smith, [19621 1 All E.R. 344 (H.L.), noted that:
The long-established and long-spoken-of contrast between "void" and
"voidable" marriages was recognized in the Marriage Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4
c. 54) by which it was provided that marriages within the prohibited degrees
(which previously to the Act were voidable) should be absolutely void. If an
ecclesiastical court pronounced a sentence of nullity in the case of a voidable
marriage the form of words used was in fact the same as that used in reference
to a void marriage. Id. at 362.
22 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, § 6, cited in Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith, [1962) 1
All E.R. 344, 361 (H.L.).
23 2 Sw. & Tr. 67 (1860).
24 Id. at 75. One commentator has observed that "It] his ruling marked a clear de-
parture from ecclesiastical practice which ... insisted on exclusive residence jurisdic-
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then dismissed the petition because by English law the marriage was
valid. The contractual basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over a
nullity action in which a void marriage is sought to be annulled has
been severely criticized25 but the law is unchanged. Epglish courts
will exercise jurisdiction even if the ceremony is the only connection
of the parties to the forum .2
The rationale of the Simonin decision was seriously undermined
by the House of Lords in Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith. In that case
the petitioner-wife sought to have a voidable marriage annulled, al-
leging incapacity or, in the alternative, willful refusal to consum-
mate. The marriage had been performed in England but at the
time of the suit the wife merely resided there while the husband
was domiciled in Scotland. This is important because unless a void
marriage is alleged, the domicile of the wife is considered to be that
of the husband. The argument made by the wife was that Simonin
supported the exercise of jurisdiction in her case, but Lord Reid con-
cluded that the ratio decidendi of Simonin was unsupportable.28
The court then held that when a voidable marriage is sought to be
annulled, the place of the ceremony by itself is not sufficient to au-
thorize jurisdiction over the matter. Further, it expressly limited the
holding of Simonin to instances where void marriages are being
contested and refused to expand the holding in Simonin to include
voidable marriages.29
Where both parties to the marriage share a common domicile,
the court of that domicile has authority to assert jurisdiction irre-
spective of whether the marriage is void or voidable. With respect
to a void marriage, common domicile as a basis of jurisdiction was
conclusively established in Von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian
Property." When a voidable marriage is in issue the general pre-
tion." Fleming, The Contractual and Residence Bases of Nullity Jurisdiction, 3 INT'L
L.Q. 228, 233 (1950).
25 Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith, [19621 1 All E.R. 344, 349 passim (H.L.).
26 Simonin was followed in Padolecchia v. Padolecchia, [1968) P. 314, 334 (1967).
Sir Jocelyn Simon noted that valid reasons existed for the assertion of jurisdiction in
addition to the precedent established in Simonin. For example, public convenience may
dictate that the court exercise jurisdiction. The court of the ceremony is especially well
qualified to decide on the validity of the marriage as its own law will be applied. In
addition, the country of celebration has an interest in correcting its civil registers. See
also W. RAYDEN, supra note 2, at 56.
27 [1962] 1 All E.R. 344 (H.L.).
28 Id. at 349.
29 The court was inclined to expressly overrule Simonin, but the fact that it had been
accepted as law for a generation inhibited this inclination. Id. at 349. Lords Cohen
and Morris concurred with Lord Reid on this point.
30 [1927] A.C. 641 (Scot.). This case is also found cited as Salvesen or Von Lorang
v. Administrator of Austrian Property. This is a principal case in the area of recogni-
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sumption of English domestic law must be kept in mind, namely,
that upon completion of the ceremony the domicile of the wife is
changed and becomes that of the husband. Thus where a voidable
defect is alleged the proper court is that of the husband's domicle.'
The domicile of either party will allow the court of that domicile
to exercise jurisdiction where a void marriage is alleged. In White v.
White12 the husband was domiciled in Australia where the ceremony
had taken place. The wife had been domiciled in England prior
to the marriage and since a void defect (bigamy) was alleged, the
court had no difficulty finding that the wife was also domiciled in
England at the commencement of the proceedings . 8  Hence it had
the authority to hear the petition of the wife and grant the appro-
priate relief. 4 Where a voidable defect is alleged, the presumption
of unity of domicile precludes jurisdiction in any court other than in
the place of the husband's domicile. 5
If a voidable marriage is sought to be annulled, the court may
also assert jurisdiction if both parties reside in England. In Ram-
say-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax,86 the wife brought a petition for
annulment on the ground of incapacity or, in the alternative, will-
ful refusal to consummate. The marriage had occurred in the United
Kingdom but the husband's domicile was Scotland. At the time of
the petition both parties resided in England, but their residency
period was less than that required by statute to authorize the exer-
tion of foreign nullity decrees and will be discussed more fully later. See text accom-
panying notes 122-23, infra.
81 This was established in De Reneville v. De Reneville, [19481 P. 100 (1947), and
followed in Parojcic v. Parojcic, (19581 1 W.L.R. 1280. In De Reneville the peti-
tion of the wife was dismissed because the domicile of the husband was in France. In
Parojcic, however, the marriage was between two Yugoslavians who had immigrated to
England, where the marriage occurred. In order to achieve justice in this case the court
found that the husband had adopted England as his domicile of choice. Thus jurisdic-
tion could be exercised on the basis of common domicile.
82 [19371 P. 111.
3 The court talked in terms of domicile and residence, but the reference to residence
was considered both unnecessary and incorrect by Lord Greene, M.R., in De Reneville v.
De Reneville, [19481 P. 100, 117 (1947).
84 This principle - domicile of either party - was followed in Apt v. Apt, [19481
P. 83 (1947), where the English petitioner-wife entered into a marriage by proxy with
an Argentine domicilary. She sought to have the ceremony annulled as void on the
ground that a proxy marriage was contra to English law. The court found that this form
of marriage created a defect in the ceremony and thus asserted jurisdiction on the basis
of the petitioner's domicle. However the place of celebration was held to be Argentina
and the validity of the marriage was to be governed by Argentine law, which considered
proxy marriages valid. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.
35 For a criticism of this presumption see Graveson, Jurisdiction, Unity of Domicile
and Choice of Law Under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, 3
INT'L L. Q. 371, 374 (1950).
86 [19561 P. 115
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cise of jurisdiction. 7  In relying on its residuary jurisdiction inher-
ited from the ecclesiastical courts, Lord Dunning noted:
It is quite clear that the ecclesiastical courts based their juris-
diction in cases of nullity on residence, not upon domicile. If the
respondent . . . was resident within the local jurisdiction of the
court, then the court had jurisdiction to determine it.38
While the facts of the case suggest a holding to the effect that com-
mon residency is necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction, resort to
the residuary jurisdiction indicates that residence of the respondent
will be sufficient.3' Reliance on the residuary bases precludes the
necessity of considering whether the defect renders the marriage
void or voidable. 4  Thus residence of the respondent will be a suf-
ficient basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in any nullity action.
Statutory bases of jurisdiction have been provided to enable a
wife to escape the difficulties inherent in a voidable marriage situa-
tion where the husband is neither domiciled nor a resident in Eng-
land. These provisions are also applicable where a void marriage
is alleged, but the necessity to rely on them in this situation probably
occurs less frequently. If a wife has been deserted by the husband
and the husband was domiciled in England immediately prior to the
desertion, jurisdiction may be exercised.4' In addition, if the wife
has been ordinarily resident in England for a three year period im-
mediately prior to commencement of the proceedings and the hus-
band is not domiciled in any other part of the United Kingdom42
the court is authorized to assert jurisdiction.43  Uninterrupted pres-
ence in England is not necessary to fulfill the residence requirement,
but the precise meaning of "ordinarily resident" has not yet been
authoritatively established.4 4  Further, it does not appear that the
whole period of residence must be during the marriage.4 5
Once the court asserts jurisdiction over a matter the next issue
presented is which country's law should be applied. When juris-
37 The statutory bases of jurisdiction are discussed in the text accompanying notes
41-45, infra.
38 [1956] P. 115, 132.
9 Hutter v. Hutter, [1944] P. 95 (dictum).
40 J. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 388-89.
41 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, § 4 0(1)(a). It has been noted that the rule has a
limited scope: "[F)irst because it is confined to cases where the husband was domiciled
in England, secondly because the desertion or deportation must precede the husband's
change of domicile, and thirdly because it only applies if the husband is deported or is
guilty of desertion." DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 300.
42 Or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.
43 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, § 40(1)(b).
44 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 301.
45 See Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott, [ 1958) P. 71.
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diction is based on the statute the law which would have been appli-
cable if both parties were domiciled in England at the commence-
ment of the proceedings is to be applied.46  Where void marriages
are in issue, even if the parties were domiciled in England, the gen-
eral rule is that the court will apply the lex loci contractus.47  For
example, in De Reneville v. De Reneville,"8 the petitioner was domi-
ciled in England prior to her marriage in France with the respond-
ent. She returned to England after living with the respondent for
some time and sought a decree of nullity on the ground of incapac-
ity, or in the alternative, willful refusal to consummate. 49  Lord
Bucknill noted that:
I think it essential that the law of one country should prevail
and that it is reasonable that the law of the country where the
ceremony of marriage took place and where the parties intended to
live together, should be regarded as the law which controls the
validity of their marriage. 50
However, the French law on this matter was never proven to the
court. The normal procedure when this occurs is for the court to
presume that the foreign law is identical to England's. 5' Lord
Bucknill was willing to do this, but Lord Greene was theoretically
inclined to remand the case to the trial court and allow petitioner
the opportunity to have the governing French law submitted into
evidence. Ultimately he decided against this procedure because of
the extreme inconvenience it would impose upon the respondent, a
foreign domiciliary,52 and the petitioner's claim was dismissed.
The De Reneville decision leaves the question open as to what
law is to be applied when a voidable marriage is sought to be an-
nulled; 53 however a safe assumption is that the law of the husband's
46 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, § 40(2). English law will not be applied in every
case. The law to be applied is dependant upon the defect alleged. J. JACKSON, supra
note 7, at 369 n.4.
47 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 364. W. RAYDEN, supra note 2, at 122.
48 [1948] P. 100.
49 Under English statutes at the time, these grounds rendered a marriage voidable,
not void. Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, § 7 (1)(a).
50 [1948] P. 100, 122 (C.A.). See also Ponticelli v. Ponticelli, [1958] P, 204.
51 See 21 MOD. L. REv. 416, 419 (1958).
52 It should be noted that in light of the facts of the particular case, petitioner had
ample opportunity to obtain the decree in France, a decree that would certainly have
been recognized in England. There is no question but that France's courts had jurisdic-
tion over the parties who, according to English law, were domiciled in France. See
notes 122-23 supra & accompanying text.
53 DicEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 362-67, present three plausible interpreta-
tions of the decision. One is that the law of the intended matrimonial domicile is to be
applied. Another is that De Reneville lays down a new choice of law rule where the
"essential validity" of the marriage is questioned - incapacity or willful refusal to con-
summate. The third is that where a question arises as to whether a marriage is void or
voidable, the law of the husband's domicile must be referred to.
19711
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domicile will govern the action, that being the personal law of the
parties.54
B. Scotland
The Scottish courts have not had the opportunity to get involved
with the jurisdictional problems associated with the void-voidable
distinction.5 5 The principal reason for this non-involvement is sim-
ply that the courts have had to deal only with petitions concerning
void marriages.5" However, from the cases that have been settled,
concrete precedent has been established.
Von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property,57 which
clearly established common domicile of the parties to be a sufficient
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by English courts, applies with
equal force in Scotland. While a void marriage was in issue in that
case, it is thought that if a voidable marriage were sought to be an-
nulled Scottish courts would assert jurisdiction under the Von Lorang
principle.58
The concept of domicile has been extended to authorize the as-
sertion of jurisdiction where only the defendant is domiciled in
Scotland. In Aldridge v. Aldridge,59 the wife, a domiciled English-
woman, sought a nullity decree on the ground that the husband
had a prior existing marriage at the time of their ceremony in En-
gland. Proof of the husband's Scottish domicile was accepted at the
trial. Lord Thompson had no difficulty in accepting jurisdiction
even though he noted that no precedent actually existed.
No express holding dictates that the court assert jurisdiction in a
similar fact situation where the defect renders the marriage voidable.
That Scottish courts will assert jurisdiction in this type of case is im-
54 See Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax, (19561 P. 115, 125. The court had an
affidavit from a Scottish lawyer which stated that Scots law was similar to English law in
these proceedings. This information was incorrect. Matheson & Webb, A Note on the
Recognition of Foreign Decrees of Nullity Granted to Scots Domiciliaries, 7 JURID. REV.
21, 22 (1962).
55 Davis, Jurisdiction in Actions of Declarator of Nullity of Marriage, Scots L.T.
[19681 49; Note, Nullity of Marriage - Jurisdiction of Forum Loci Celebrationis,
Scots L.T. [19611 93. This does not mean that the distinction does not exist. For a
discussion of the current state of Scots law on the distinction see Clive, Void and Void-
able Marriages in Scots Law, 13 JURID. REV. 209 (1968).
56 Von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property, [19271 A.C. 641 (Scot.); Di
Rollo v. Di Rollo, [19581 Sess. Cas. 75; Aldridge v. Aldridge, [19541 Sess. Cas. 58;
Prawdzic-Lazarska v. Prawdzic-Lazarski, [19541 Sess. Cas. 981 (1953); MacDougall v.
Chitnavis, [1937) Sess. Cas. 390; Balshaw v. Kelly, [19671 Sots L.T. 5.
57 [19271 A.C. 641 (Scot.).
58 The commentators on this point seem to feel that the domicile of the husband is
controlling, irrespective of Von Lorang. A. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
295 (1967); Davis, supra note 55, at 49.
59 [19541 Sess. Cas. 58.
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plied by dictum in Balshaw v. Kelly. 0 There the husband had ob-
tained a Scottish domicile of choice. The ceremony had taken place
in England where the respondent wife was currently domiciled. The
husband sought a nullity decree alleging his wife's bigamy. The
court felt the controlling element regarding the exercise of jurisdic-
tion was the husband's domicile, irrespective that he was the peti-
tioner. Clearly if the man's domicile is to be controlling, no judicial
tension is involved by asserting jurisdiction where the defect renders
the marriage voidable.
It is clear that the emphasis upon the husband's domicile will
result in a hardship to a wife whose husband takes up domicile in
another country. This is alleviated somewhat by statute. After
1949, the court was authorized to assert jurisdiction if the wife has
been ordinarily resident in Scotland for a period of three years im-
mediately prior to the commencement of the proceedings.6 ' Further,
the statute makes no reference to whether the marriage is void or
voidable. In addition, it has been argued that the Scottish courts
are likely to assert jurisdiction where the wife is domiciled in Scot-
land."2 This argument is bolstered by the language used in Balshaw
where Lord Kissen sated: "It seems to me in accordance with prin-
ciple that either party should ...be entitled to invoke the law of
that party's domicile on the question of status." '  If domicile can
be established with less than three years residence, the statutory pro-
vision could conceivably become meaningless.
There is some controversy as to whether the courts will assert ju-
risdiction solely because the celebration had occurred there. The cases
supporting this as a basis of jurisdiction have been undermined.64
Nonetheless, the issue was decided in the affirmative in Prawdzic-
Lazarska v. Prawdzic-Lazarski.65 In that case, however, not only
was Scotland the place of celebration, but the wife had also been
ordinarily resident there for three years. One commentator has
argued that the mere fact of celebration is not likely to be sufficient
60 [1967] Scots L.T. 5.
61 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, § 2. The definitions of the
terms used in this section, such as "ordinarily resident" do not appear to have been
presented to the courts for clarification.
62 Davis, supra note 55, at 49-50.
63 [1966] Scots L.T.R. 297, at 301.
64 Simonin v. Mallac, [1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. The limitation of this case to void
marriages in England was discussed earlier. See notes 27-29 supra & accompanying
text. Scottish courts have relied on the Simonin decision. See MacDougall v. Chitna-
vis, [1937] Sess. Cas. 390; Miller v. Deakin, [1912] 1 Scots L.T.R. 253. In MacDou-
gall however, Lord President Normand thought that the question may have to be recon-
sidered.
65 [1954] Sess. Cas. 98.
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for the assertion of jurisdiction irrespective of the defect alleged.66
Another has argued that where a void marriage is contested, the
place of celebration should be a sufficient base.6" The latter proposi-
tion is likely to be followed by the Scottish courts, but in all likeli-
hood they will also require that the defendant be personally served
there.6"
Residence of both or either party has not as yet been held to be
a basis for jurisdiction. But the argument has been urged that a 40
day residence is all that should be required when a void marriage is
questioned.6" The dictum of Lord Thompson in Aldridge supports
this position where he suggests that because a void marriage confers
no status, "the grounds of jurisdiction should be the ordinary grounds
competent in a civil court."'  Further, some treatise writers are
also in favor of unrestricted jurisdiction over void marriages. 71 Hence
while some support exists for residency as a basis of jurisdiction in
Scotland, the support extends only to void marriages and not to void-
able ones.
.The void-voidable distinction is considered significant in Scot-
land when the question as to proper law arises. If the court is being
asked to annul a void marriage it normally will apply the law which
governed the marriage at the time of its creation. 72  The courts are
not averse, however, to discarding this principle when its application
66 A. ANTON, supra note 58, states:
Simonin v. Mallac is not binding as an authority in Scotland, so that there
is here no question of overruling a long-standing authority. Since it has been
largely deprived of its persuasive authority, the Scottish decisions which rest
upon it would appear to have lost their force [as a result of Ross-Smith v.
Ross-Smith, [1962] 1 All E.R. 344]. The court will require to consider
the question de novo, and it seems unlikely that the doctrine of jurisdiction
ratione contractus will survive in matters of status. Id. at 299.
67 Davis, supra note 55, at 50, notes, correctly this writer believes, that "[t]he deci-
sion in Ross-Smith thus lends no clear support to the contention of Professor Anton that
an accepted ground of jurisdiction [place of celebration] over void marriages may have
to be abandoned by the Court of Session."
68 This personal service was missing in MacDougall v. Chitnavis, [1937] Sess. Cas.
390, and Davis, supra note 55, at 51, suggests that this may have been the reason for
the expressed misgiving regarding the exercise of jurisdiction. As noted earlier, the
wife's compliance with the statutory requirement of three years residence negated the
necessity for personal service on the husband. See Pradwzic-Lazarska v. Prawdzic-Lazar-
ski, [1954] Sess. Cas. 98.
69 Davis, supra note 55, at 51-52.
70 Aldridge v. Aldridge, [1954] Sess. Cas. 58, 85.
71See, e.g., G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 318 (7th ed. 1965);
Davis, supra note 55, at 51-52. See also Aldridge v. Aldridge, [1954] Sess. Cas. 58,
where Lord Thompson adds in dictum: "There can be little objection to increasing the
grounds of jurisdiction for entertaining an action of nullity, provided the Court which
accepts the jurisdiction is careful to see that the proper law is applied." Id. at 85.
72 Aldridge v. Aldridge, [1954] Sess. Cas. 58, 60.
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would result in a decision which is offensive to Scottish law.7" When
a voidable marriage is in issue, the personal law of the parties at
the time of the proceedings will be applied.7 4
C. Canada
The Canadian courts are presumably no longer plagued with the
void-voidable distinction as it relates to their jurisdiction over annul-
ment actions. The reason for this is that in 1968 Parliament en-
acted An Act Respecting Divorce which incorporated the traditional
defects that rendered marriages voidable (incapacity and willful re-
fusal to consummate) into the grounds for divorce." Thus it ap-
pears that nullity actions which will be brought in the future will
be to annul void marriages. Also bigamy, a major ground for void
marriage annulments, has been included in the Divorce Act as a
ground for divorce.7' The ensuing discussion will concern itself
with the bases of jurisdiction where a void marriage is alleged.77
Where a marriage has been celebrated in a given province, that
element by itself is likely to be sufficient for the court of that prov-
ince to exercise jurisdiction.78  However the authority for this prop-
osition is more restricted than is desirable. For example, in both
Grower v. Starrett7 9 and Spencer v. Ladd,0 while the courts pur-
portedly based their decision on the fact that the celebration had
occurred in the province, in both instances the petitioning wife was
also domiciled in that province.
Jurisdiction will be exercised in a nullity action if both parties
are domiciled in the province.8 Domicile of the petitioner has
been held to be sufficient in a few cases but the rationale utilized by
78 Prawdzic-Lazarska v. Prawdzic-Lazarski, [1954] Sess. Cas. 98, 102; MacDougall
v. Chitnavis, [1937] Sess. Cas. 390.
74 A. ANTON, supra note 58, at 300.
7 5 An Act Respecting Divorce 1968, § 4(1)(d).
76 Id. § 3(c). The Divorce Act is reprinted in J. MACDONALD, CANADIAN DIVORCE
LAW AND PRACTICE (1969). This work contains the rules of procedure governing
every province, the forms applicable in each, and a practitioner's check list for every
ground for divorce covered by the Act.
77 For purposes of comparison with the other countries' treatment of voidable mar-
riages the grounds for jurisdiction over a divorce in Canada are reproduced. Section
5(1) authorizes jurisdiction when the petition is presented by a Canadian domiciliary
and either the petitioner or respondent has been ordinarily resident in that province for
a period of one year prior to the proceeding. During this period the actual residence
must have existed for ten months.
78 See, e.g., Spencer v. Ladd, [1948] 1 D.L.R. 39 (Alta.); Grower v. Starrett, [1948]
2 D.L.R. 853 (B.C.). But see Hutchings v. Hutchings, [19301 4 D.L.R. 673 (Man.).
79 [1948] 2 D.L.R. 853 (B.C.).
80 £1948] 1 D.L.R. 39 (Alta.).
81 Diachuk v. Diachuk, [1941] 2 W.W.R. 599 (Man.); Fleming v. Fleming, [1934]
4 D.L.R. 90 (Ont.).
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the court placed emphasis on the fact that it was righting a wrong."
The argument might be made that an analogy to the jurisdictional
provisions of the Divorce Act is appropriate. Section 5 authorizes
jurisdiction if the petitioner is domiciled in Canada 3 and either the
petitioner or respondent has been an ordinary resident in that prov-
ince for one year preceding the petition.84 If this argument were
to prevail it would extend the rules of jurisdiction heretofore estab-
lished by the common law, namely that residence of the respondent
in the province will be sufficient,85 but residence of the petitioner
will not.8
Because void marriages are likely to be the only ones where a
nullity decree will be sought, choice of law problems presumably
will be non-existent. Canadian courts are quite willing to apply the
lex loci celebrationis when they are confronted with a petition to
annul a void marriage."' This accords with the general English
rule.88
D. Australia
Australia has retained, for the most part, the English distinction
between void and voidable marriages. This distinction is expressly
promulgated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959.89 However Aus-
tralia, like Canada, has provided that a spouse's willful refusal to
consummate the marriage is a ground for divorce. 0 Similar to
England and Scotland, incapacity will render a marriage voidable.
The statute incorporates the recommendation of the Royal Commis-
sion on Marriage and Divorce that voidable marriages be treated
82 Finlay v. Boetner, [1948] 1 D.L.R. 39 (Alta.) . See also Somberg v. Zaracoff
and Rothblatt, [1949] Que.L.R. 301. In Quebec, higher authority has ruled to the
contrary in Main v. Wright, [1945] K.B. 105 (Que. C.A.). However, the principle of
stare decisis is not applicable in that province.
83 For a discussion of the concept of Canadian domicile under the Divorce Act, see
generally Mendes da Costa, Some Comments on the Conflict of Laws Provisions of the
Divorce Act, 1968, 48 CAN. B. REV. 252, 260-62 (1968). The constitutionality of Par-
liament's creating a Canadian domicile is discussed in Jordan, The Federal Divorce Act
(1968) andthe Constitution, 14 McGILL L.J. 209, 236-44 (1968).
84 "Neither 'ordinarily resident' nor 'actually resided' [see note 77 supra] are de-
fined in the Act. The assumption appears to be that a person may be 'ordinarily resident'
in a province without 'actually' being so resident. Presumably actual residence connotes
a degree of physical presence not required to establish ordinary residence." Mendes da
Costa, supra note 83, at 272.
85 Castel, Canadian Private International Law Rules Relating to Domestic Relations,
5 MCGILL L.J. 1, 9 (1958).
86 Hutchings v. Hutchings, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 673 (Man.).
87 See, e.g., Hunt v. Hunt, [19581 14 D.L.R.2d 243 (Ont.).
88 See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
89 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, §§ 18, 21.
9 0 Id. § 28.
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like divorces with respect to rules of jurisdiction." Thus jurisdic-
tion will be authorized in an action to annul a voidable marriage
only if the petitioner is domiciled in Australia. 2 To avoid the pre-
sumption that in a voidable marriage the wife's domicile becomes
that of the husband, the statute provides that a woman is considered
domiciled in Australia if she has resided there for three years prior to
the proceeding."8
The emphasis on domicile is lessened when a void marriage is
being questioned. Jurisdiction will be exercised if the petitioner is
either domiciled or resident in Australia. 4  The statute defines resi-
dency as "ordinarily resident in the Territory," 5 which has been con-
strued to be the place where one has his home despite absence from
it for a substantial period of time." An alternative definition pro-
vided by the statute is that the petitioner must have been a resident
in the Territory for a period of not less than six months prior to
the proceeding. Implicit in this section of the statute is the concept
of an Australian domicile as opposed to a particular state or terri-
tory domicile.9 The fact that the petitioner has moved from state
to state will not preclude the court from asserting jurisdiction, if
91 Id. § 23. See Mann, The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce: Jurisdic-
tion of English Courts and Recognition of Foreign Decrees, 21 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1958),
for a discussion of the Commission's report.
92 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 23(4).
98 Id. § 24(2). In essence, the provision is identical to those contained in Matri-
monial Causes Act 1965, § 40(1)(b) (Eng.) and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1949, § 2 (Scot.). For a criticism see Graveson, Jurisdiction, Unity of Domicile
and Choice of Law Under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, 3
INT'L L.Q. 371, 374 (1950).
94 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 23(5).
95Id. § 23(7)(a).
96 P. JOSKE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 170 (4th ed. 1963, Supp. 1966). No cases
have been decided on this point since the enactment of this particular statute. However,
the question had been considered earlier in Caldwell v. Caldwell, [19461 S. Austl. 185.
There the husband was in the service and stationed in Queensland where he was also
domiciled. He married respondent in the State of South Australia where she was domi-
ciled prior to the marriage. While he was stationed elsewhere, the wife rented a room
from her mother which became the matrimonial home. Petitioner's husband would
cohabit with his wife there when he was on a leave. Upon his discharge he returned
to the matrimonial home only to be informed that his wife loved another. After re-
maining in South Australia for six months he petitioned for a divorce. In calculating
his year of residence which the statute required the court counted nearly six months
when he had been stationed in Queensland.
97 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 23(7)(b).
98 Barry, J., in Lloyd v. Lloyd, [1962] Vict. 70 (1961), stated:
I see no reason inherent in the common law concept of domicile why the Par-
liament of the Commonwealth is not competent to create or recognize the ex-
istence of an Australian domicile for the purpose of its law with respect to
matrimonial causes, even though for other purposes the domicile of an Austral-
ian citizen may be connected only with a State or Territory. Id. at 71.
It has been suggested that such a view is consistent with the intention of the statute.
Cowen & Mendes da Costa, The Unity of Domicile, 78 L.Q. REV. 62, 67 (1962).
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the six months residence requirement has been fulfilled. Jurisdiction
then does not present a difficult problem in Australia, as com-
pared to the other countries considered, because it is governed ex-
clusively by statute. It should be noted, however, that the Aus-
tralian courts do not have jurisdiction to annul a void marriage
merely on the basis of the marriage being celebrated there.99
Once jurisdiction is established, the courts are directed to proceed
and give relief in accordance with the principles and rules applied by
the English ecclesiastical courts prior to the Matrimonial Causes Act
1857."° Thus when a void marriage is sought to be annulled, the
Australian courts will apply the lex loci celebrationis.'°' If the cele-
bration occurred prior to the enactment of the statute the court will
proceed in accordance with the procedures of the statute, but will
apply the law which existed at the time of the celebration.0 2 Where
a voidable marriage is in issue, the law of the domicile (husband's)
will be applied. 10 3
E. United States
In the United States, jurisdiction over annulment actions is a mat-
ter governed exclusively by the states. 10 4  Where states have enacted
statutes granting the courts jurisdiction, the various bases for the
exercise of it are as follows: (1) that the plaintiff shall be a domicili-
99 Morris, The Australian Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
641, 643 (1962).
100 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 25.
101 P. JOSKE, supra note 96, at 229.
102 Vidovic v. Vidovic, [1967) Vict. 680. In this case the Victorian Marriage Act
1958 rendered a result no different than would have been obtained had the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1959 been applied.
103 Corlevich v. Corlevich, [1954] S. Austl. 131; P. JosKE, supra note 96, at 238;
1 ADELAIDE L. REv. 87 (1960-62).
104 Originally courts in the United States exercised jurisdiction over matrimonial
causes on the basis of their equity power. Chancellor Kent in Wightman v. Wightman,
4 Johns. Ch. 343 (1820), stated that: "All matrimonial, and other causes of ecclesiastical
cognisance, belonged originally to the temporal Courts; . . . and when the Spiritual
Courts cease, the cognisance of such causes would seem, as of course, to revert back to
the lay tribunals." Id. at 347. However, the power of equity was interpreted differ-
ently in the courts of the various states. In a comprehensive study of the development
of this jurisdiction, Speca, The Development of Jurisdiction in Annulment and Mar-
riage Cases, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 109, 134 (1954), it is observed that five separate
theories emerged regarding the power of an equity court. These are as follows:
1. The Court of Chancery had inherent power to rescind a contract based on fraud,
duress, or mistake, or lack of consent, and to annul a marriage where the impediment
was the same as in an ordinary contract.
2. No court had jurisdiction without intervention of legislation.
3. The rules applied in the Ecclesiastical Courts were part of the English common
law which we adopted in our common law.
4. Annulment was not recognized as a proper form of relief between husband
and wife.
5. The Chancery Court was a court of granted powers - whatever power it had
must have been specifically conferred on it either by the Constitution or by statute.
ANNULMENTS
ary of the state at the commencement of the action; (2) that at least
one of the parties be a domiciliary of the state at the commencement
of the action; (3) that one of the parties must reside in the county
where the action is brought; and (4) where a local marriage is in-
volved, residency of the parties is irrelevant. " The majority of
states, however, have left the resolution of nullity jurisdiction to the
courts. 106 The practices of these courts indicates rather clearly that
domicile is a proper base for the assertion of jurisdiction, especially
if both parties are domiciled in the state.1 7
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts'0 8 urges that a court
have the power to exercise jurisdiction in a nullity proceeding under
the following circumstances. It would have jurisdiction if the action
were for divorce, or if the state has a paramount interest in the ac-
tion, or finally if the marriage were celebrated within its bound-
aries.'09 These bases of jurisdiction have been recognized by Amer-
ican courts for many years." 0  Further, whether a marriage is void
or voidable does not appear to be a factor of consideration in the
courts' decisions."' Normally, the state can be said to have a para-
mount interest in the status of the parties if one or both of them
resides or is domiciled in that state. In addition, if the marriage
was celebrated within the state, jurisdiction is usually authorized".2
though personal service on the defendant has been required."'
105Vernon, Labyrinthine Ways: Jurisdiction to Annul, 10 J. PUB. L. 47, 50-52
(1961).
106 Id. at 65. In his article Vernon provides an extremely comprehensive and de-
tailed study of the practices of all these states. The intent of this Note is not to dupli-
cate his study, but instead to merely highlight the elements upon which state courts
generally will or will not exercise jurisdiction in order to make some comparison with
the other four countries considered herein. Obviously, any assertions are subject to
refutation by the practice of one or two states, and to this extent the ultimate compari-
son is suspect.
107 Id.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs (Proposed Official Draft
1967).
109 Id. § 76. The Restatement position is that the rules of jurisdiction should be
the same for the annulment and divorce proceedings. Id. § 76 comment c. It has
been argued, however, that this equivalance is inappropriate because divorce jurisdic-
tion statutes are drafted to discourage hasty divorces. Nullity decrees, especially where
void marriages are involved, should be judicially declared void as soon as possible.
Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 734, 736 (1953).
110 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 560 (rev. ed. of The Law of Conflict of
Laws 1968).
III See, e.g., McCormack v. McCormack, 175 Cal. 292, 165 P. 930 (1917) (void);
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912) (void); Newton v.
Lehman, 67 Ill. App. 2d 302,214 N.E. 2d 142 (3d D.Ct. App. 1966).
112 R. LEFLAR, supra note 110, at 560.
113 State ex rel. Pavlo v. Scoggin, 60 N.M. 111, 287 P.2d 998 (1955). The proviso
regarding personal jurisdiction over the defendant is included by the drafters of the
Restatement in comment c, of § 76.
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However, it should be noted that the principle of domicile has de-
cidedly prevailed over the place of celebration as a jurisdictional
basis in the United States. 14
In the United States the general rule is that in a nullity action
the lex loci celebrationis is applicable." 5 As a result, American
courts have had to resort to public policy rationales to apply a law
other than that of the place of celebration. 16 Adoption of the
English rule, that when a voidable marriage is alleged the law of
the domicile ought to control, would preclude policy-oriented deci-
sions and be more consistent with the choice of law principles es-
poused in the Restatement. 17
III. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN NULLITY DECREES
A. England
The problem of recognition of foreign nullity decrees is basically
a question of the competence of the court which rendered the de-
cree." 8  The competence of the rendering court is ascertained by
asking whether it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. Normally the English courts will recognize a foreign nul-
lity decree granted by a court at the place where both parties to the
marriage were domiciled when the proceedings commenced.'" A
corollary to this is recognition of a decree which would be recog-
nized by the court of common domicile. 20  Finally, it has been es-
tablished that the English courts will recognize a decree rendered
by the court of the place where the marriage was celebrated, pro-
vided the marriage was void. 121
The rule that English courts would recognize a decree rendered
by the court where both parties were domiciled was firmly estab-
114 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 122-23
nn.9, 10 (1968); 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAW 579 (2d ed. 1958).
115 Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. REV. 849, 866 (1959);
Vernon, supra note 105, at 77. Such a rule obviously ignores the void-voidable distinc-
tion.
116 E. RABEL, supra note 114, at 583.
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (Proposed Official Draft
1967).
118Grodecki, Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees, 74 L.Q. REV. 225, 226
(1958).
119 W. RAYDEN, PRACTICE AND LAW OF DIVORCE 81 (10th ed. J. Jackson 1967);
DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 371.
120 This principle was originally established in a case which dealt with recogni-
tion of a foreign divorce decree, Armitage v. Attorney General, [1906] P. 135. The
court had little difficulty in applying the principle to a foreign nullity decree annul-
ling a voidable marriage when the first opportunity presented itself 55 years later.
Abate v. Abate, [1961] P. 29.
121 Merker v. Merker, [1963] P. 283; W. RAYDEN, supra note 119 at 82.
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lished in Von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property.1 22
There the House of Lords recognized a German nullity decree which
annulled a marriage celebrated in France. At the time of the Ger-
man proceeding both parties were domiciled in Germany. The
German court applied the lex loci celebrationis because the defects
went to the formalities of the ceremony. Hence even if the decree
were originally sought in England, the result would be the same
because English courts would have applied the same law.123
The issue of whether the domicile of the husband was sufficient
to render the decreeing court competent was faced by the court in
Chapelle v. ChapelleY.4 In that case the petitioner husband sought
a divorce decree in England. He had been domiciled in Malta but
had married an English domiciliary in England. Subsequently the
parties returned to Malta. The husband obtained a nullity decree
there on the ground that no religious ceremony had ever been per-
formed. Later the husband moved to England (thereby acquiring
a new domicile of choice) and, unclear as to his marital status in
England, sought a divorce. The wife pleaded that the nullity decree
was controlling. The court, however, noted that the Malta decree
rendered the marriage void. That being the case, it did not follow
that her domicile became that of the husband's by operation of law.
She also failed to prove that she had acquired Maltese domicile in
any other manner, so the court, purportedly following Von Lorang,
refused to recognize the decree and granted the husband relief.
The Chapelle decision has been subjected to much criticism.' 25
Specifically, since the ceremony was performed in England, the court
should have looked to English law to determine the validity of the
ceremony.' 26 Under English law the marriage was clearly valid; thus
the wife's domicile would have been that of the husband's by opera-
tion of law. Malta then would have been the common domicile of
the parties and the Maltese decree recognizable. Another incon-
gruity of the decision is the court's willingness to assume the cor-
rectness of the Maltese court's decree that the marriage was void.12 7
By the definition of a void marriage propounded by the Court of
Appeal in De Reneville v. De Reneville, 2 8 the marriage was void
122 [1927] A.C. 641 (Scot.).
123 This aspect was not crucial to the decision, however. DICEY & MORRIS, supra
note 8, at 372.
124 [19501 P. 134.
125 DICEY & MoRRis, supra note 8, at 374 n.72; Grodecki, supra note 118, at 230-32
& n.31.
126 DICEY & MORRIs, supra note 8, at 374
127 Grodecki, supra note 118, at 234.
128 [1948] P. 100, 111 (C.A.).
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without the benefit of a decree. The problem with this definition
is that it lacks precision in an international choice of law context,
because if it were correct, then no recognition problem arises where
a void marriage is in issue.129
Whether the Chapelle decision is still binding in England is
questionable. Under a similar fact situation, except that the husband
apparently obtained a Maltese domicile by choice after the marriage,
the Court of Appeal in Gray v. Formosa'3" was divided on whether
Chapelle should govern. Two years later, however, it observed in
Lepre v. Lepre'' that the discussion in Gray was dictum. Because
the husband was domiciled in Malta, that court was competent to
declare his status. The decree constituted judgment in rem and
thus "should be regarded universally as conclusive as to his status .
... "1.2 However, in both Gray and Lepre the decrees were not rec-
ognized on the rationale that they offended the English concept of
justice. Thus, irrespective of the rule which English courts might
formulate as to recognition of foreign nullity decrees, the result in
each particular case is likely to be decided on the basis of its facts.
Only by analogy to the recognition of foreign divorce decrees
by English courts can the Von Lorang rule be expanded. 3 This ex-
pansion would include the recognition of nullity decrees pronounced
by foreign courts where only one of the parties was domiciled
or where jurisdiction was exercised on the basis of the residence of
the parties. The leading case in this area is Travers v. Holley,"3 4
where the Court of Appeal recognized a foreign divorce despite the
fact that the wife was not domiciled at the place of the court.'85
The court of New South Wales had asserted jurisdiction under a de-
serted wife statute136 which authorized jurisdiction where a wife had
129 For a criticism of the definitions of the marriage categories enunciated by the De
Reneville court see, Grodecki, Recent Developments in Nullity Jurisdiction, 20 MOD.
L .REV. 566, 569-73 (1957).
130 [1963] P. 259 (C.A.). Lord Denning, M. R. and Donovan, L. J. would not
recognize the Malta decree rendering an English marriage void because no religious cere-
mony was performed and thus followed the Chapelle reasoning. Pearson, L. J., how-
ever, was convinced that the decree should be recognized.
131 [1965] P. 52.
132 Id. at 62. This view is approved by DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 374.
133 The analogy is appropriate in light of the effect upon the parties' status under
either an annulment or a divorce decree.
134 [1953] P. 246 (C.A.).
135 For a discussion of English recognition of foreign divorces prior to the Travers
decision and an argument anticipating the result see Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Divorce Decrees - A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 226-
33 (1951). Subsequent to the Travers decision Dean Griswold wrote a short comment
praising it. Griswold, The Reciprocal Recognition of Divorce Decrees, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 823 (1954).
136 New South Wales Matrimonial Causes Act 1899, § 16(a).
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resided in the county for three years preceeding the action. After
noting that England had identical statutory provisions, 8 ' Lord Hod-
son concluded that:
where, as here, there is in substance reciprocity, it would be con-
trary to principle and inconsistent with comity if the courts of this
country were to refuse to recognize a jurisdiction which mutatis
mutandis they claim for themselves.' 38
Theoretically, the Travers reciprocity principle is appealing with
respect to the recognition of foreign nullity decrees;189 however, it
has presented problems in its application.' 40 The facts of Travers do
not determine whether the reciprocity must be of statutory jurisdic-
tional allowances or factual situations. Equivalent statutory pro-
visions were involved in Carr v. Cart'4' where the court recognized a
divorce decree of the Northern Ireland court. However in Dunne
v. Saban 4' the court refused to recognize a Florida decree where the
Florida statute authorized jurisdiction when a deserted wife had been
a resident in Florida for ninety days. In fact the wife had resided
in the state for two years prior to bringing the action. The English
court found that the ninety day residence requirement was not suf-
ficiently similar to the three year requirement 14 3 in England and
hence it did not recognize the decree. It appears, however, that the
"jurisdictional approach" adopted in Carr and Dunne does not repre-
sent the present English attitude toward expanding the Travers prin-
ciple in divorce recognition cases. 144  A "factual approach"' 45 was
137 Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, § 13 (Eng.).
138 Travers v. Holley, [1953] P. 246, 257. Lord Sommervell remarked: "On prin-
ciple it seems to me plain that our courts in this matter should recognize a jurisdiction
which they themselves claim." Id. at 251.
139 It is consistent with the principle enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon which de-
pends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion
of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a
right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth
or existence of that crucial fact. Id. at 230.
The thesis that the Travers court might have been unconsciously adopting the Williams
approach was expressed in Webb, Recognition in England of Non-Domiciliary Divorce
Decrees, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 608, 618-21 (1957).
140 Wiesner, Recognition of American Divorces in England, 8 S.D.L. REV. 95
(1963).
141 [1955) 1 All E.R. 61. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1939, § 26 (N. Ire.),
provided that jurisdiction could be exercised over a wife's petition for divorce if the
husband had been domiciled in Northern Ireland immediately prior to deserting the
wife. The facts allowed the assertion of jurisdiction under this provision which was
similar to § 18(1)(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 (Eng.).
142 [1955] P. 178.
143 Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, § 18(1)(6).
144 Webb, supra note 139, notes that these cases "[r]eveal the logical outcome of
applying the literal rule of statutory interpretation even if they also betray a tendency
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adopted in Arnold v. Arnold 4' when the court was unable to find
a similarity in the foreign jurisdiction statute. The court noted that
since the wife had been a resident of the foreign country for more
than three years prior to the divorce, an English court would have
been able to assert jurisdiction had the action been brought in
England. Accordingly the decree was recognized. But it should
be noted that the problem here is not the expansion of the Travers
doctrine, but rather its extension to foreign nullity decrees. 47
The Travers principle has been applied to a foreign nullity de-
cree, albeit in dictum, in Merker v. Merker.148  In that case two Po-
lish domiciliaries, serving in the Polish army in Germany, were mar-
ried in a Roman Catholic ceremony there. However, the formalities
of German law were not complied with. Later the wife left the
husband because of his alleged cruelty. The German court declared
the marriage a complete nullity. There was a discrepancy between
the English and German definition of void, namely void under Ger-
man law was equivalent to voidable under English law. If the
proper German law had been applied, the decree would have pro-
nounced the marriage non-existent rather than void. Nonetheless,
Sir Jocelyn Simon felt the German court should
be recognized as competent to annul the marriage in this case, on
the ground that it was celebrated in Germany and was in German
law properly void ipso jure. Even if regard were to be paid at
this stage to the form of the Aurich judgment and the marriage
were to be considered voidable in the conflict of law sense . . .the
parties were both resident within the jurisdiction of the Aurich
court at the time of the proceedings, and the English courts claim
jurisdiction in such circumstances .... 149
Thus English courts will recognize a foreign nullity decree if both
parties were resident within the jurisdiction of the decreeing court.
towards 'homeward tendism' and show up some of the evils of enacting unilateral con-
flict of law rules." Id. at 615.
145 This was first delineated by Dean Griswold, supra note 135, at 227-28.
146 [19571 P. 237.
147 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 8, at 376, argue that the application of the Travers
doctrine is reasonable where the foreign court asserted jurisdiction on facts similar to
those recognized by the English statute. Recognition would obtain if the nullity decree
was granted to a wife who had been deserted or her husband had been deported from a
country and prior to either event he had been domiciled in the country whose court
issued the decree. In addition, the decree could be recognized if the wife was ordi-
narily a resident in the country where the issuing court was located for three years
immediately prior to the proceedings. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, § 4 0(1)(a)
& (6). Under this argument an English court could recognize the decree even if the
foreign court did not have a similar statute.
148 [19631 P. 283.
1491d. at 296-97. Cited in support of the propositions are Ross-Smith v. Ross-
Smith, [19621 1 All E.R. 344; Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax, [19561 P. 115. In
addition, Sir Simon cited Travers and noted that it would be contrary to principle and
inconsistent with comity not to recognize the decree of a competent foreign court.
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Whether recognition will be extended to nullity decrees issued
by foreign courts whose basis for jurisdiction is not equivalent to
any recognized by English courts, such as residence of the wife for
less than three years, is a question which must be answered in future
decisions. The indication is that the decree will be recognized. In
Indyka v. Indyka,50 the House of Lords recognized a foreign di-
vorce decree rendered prior to the enactment of the English stat-
ute.' This statute authorized English courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a deserted wife's petition, provided that the wife had
resided in England for three years immediately prior to the proceed-
ing. In examining the separate opinions given regarding recogni-
tion of foreign divorce decrees one point stands out - a foreign
court's competence is not dependent upon its exercising rules of
jurisdiction identical to those in England.'
B. Scotland
Scottish recognition of foreign nullity decrees is similar to En-
gland's rules but much more restrictive. The basic rule is that a for-
eign decree pronounced by a competent court will be recognized in
Scotland. 5" However, the dearth of cases dealing with recognition
of foreign nullity decrees dictates that any discussion of the expan-
sion of the basic rule be merely speculative.
One settled principle of Scottish law is that a decree issued'by a
foreign court located in the place of common domicile of the parties
will be recognized.' 54 This holds true whether the marriage was
void or voidable. In addition, recognition will probably obtain if
150 [1967) 2 All E.R. 689.
151 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1949. The wife had resided in Czechoslovakia for
well over three years prior to the proceeding.
152 Lord Reid felt that the decree of the court where the matrimonial home is lo-
cated should be recognized. In this respect, he added, he could "see no good reason for
making any distinction between the husband and the wife. If we recognize a decree
granted to the one, we ought equally to recognise a decree granted to the other .
Indykav. Indyka, [1967] 2 All E.R. 689, 702. Lord Morris stated that:
The evidence was that the Czech court accepted jurisdiction on the ground
that both the parties were and always had been Czechoslovakian citizens.
The first wife at the time when she presented her petition in Czechoslovakia
undoubtedly had a real and substantial connexion with that country. I see no
reason why the decree ... should not.., be recognised. Id. at 708.
Lord Wilberforce, in noting that Travers v. Holley was clearly an unexceptional decision
stated that: "I am unwilling to accept either that the law as to recognition of foreign
divorces (still less other) jurisdiction must be a mirror image of our own law or that
the pace of recognition must be geared to the haphazard movement of our legislative
process." Id. at 727.
153 See A. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-01 (1967), for a discus-
sion of the historical development of this principle.
154 The case which establishes this rule in Scotland is the same case which governs
in England, Von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property, [1927) A.C. 641 (Scot.).
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the decreeing court asserted jurisdiction on bases similar to those
where Scottish courts by statute are authorized to exercise jurisdiction.
This is limited to suits brought by a wife, notwithstanding the hus-
band's domicile, who has been a resident of Scotland for three years
immediately preceeding the commencement of the proceedings.15
Finally, the courts of Scotland are likely to recognize a nullity de-
cree of a void marriage if the celebration occurred at the place of
the court. 56
If Warden v. Warden157 represents the ultimate statement re-
garding Scottish recognition of divorce decrees, then the Travers
principle of reciprocity is unlikely to have any effect in Scotland. In
Warden the husband petitioner, a domiciliary of Scotland, sought a
divorce decree in Scotland based on his wife's adultery. The wife
pleaded, in essence, that a Nevada divorce obtained by her was res
judicata in the instant proceeding. The argument for recognition
of this decree was that since the courts of Scotland were authorized
to exercise jurisdiction in an action brought by a wife who was a
resident in Scotland for three years prior to the proceeding, 158 a
foreign court exercising jurisdiction on a residency basis was com-
petent. However, nothing in the opinion indicated that in fact the
wife had been a resident in Nevada for three years prior to her peti-
tion for divorce. That proposition not being asserted, Lord Stra-
chan was probably justified in assuming that she was a resident in
Nevada only for the period required by statute, namely six weeks.
Thus the nonrecognition of the Nevada decree was arguably the ap-
propriate result, and, had the Travers principle been in effect in
Scotland at that time, the decision would likely be the same.159
155 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, § 2. It has been suggested
that this provision is exhaustive where the assertion of jurisdiction is based on residence.
Matheson & Webb, A Note on the Recognition of Foreign Decrees of Nullity Granted
to Scots Domiciliaries, 7 JURID. REv. 21, 26 (1962). "If the Scottish courts accept the
Travers v. Holley principle ... they would presumably recognise foreign nullity decrees
based on similar residential qualifications; otherwise, there would seem to be no ground
upon which such decrees may be recognized." A. ANTON, supra note 153, at 303.
156 Hitherto, the Scottish courts have assumed jurisdiction only where Scotland
was the locus celebrationis and the marriage was found to be void .... Given,
however, that the Scottish courts themselves assume jurisdiction in the case of
void marriages where Scotland is the locus celebrationis, it seems only rea-
sonable also to expect them to recognize a decree granted by a foreign court
which assumed jurisdiction on the same basis (even if one or both of the
parties are domiciled in Scotland) provided that the marriage was void in the
eyes of Scots law and that there was not any other reason for impugning the
decree. Matheson & Webb, supra note 155, at 29.
157 [1951] Sess. Cas. 508.
158 See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, § 2.
159 See, e.g., Dunne v. Saban, [19551 P. 178, where a Florida decree of divorce was
not recognized because jurisdiction was based on a statute requiring only a ninety day
residency period. The "real and substantial" connection test promulgated by Lord Reid
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Lord Strachan's dictum in Warden, however, must be overcome
if Scottish courts are to expand the recognition of foreign decrees
where jurisdiction was exercised on grounds similar to those acknowl-
edged in Scotland. For example, the good Lord felt that if recipro-
cal recognition were meant to be the rule, Parliament would have
explicitly provided for it in the statute.' 60 This reasoning is clearly
inconsistent with that of the English Court of Appeal in Travers.'
Should the appropriate cases present themselves to the Scottish courts,
and if the most restrictive reading of the Travers principle were
adopted,'62 then recognition would obtain when the foreign court's
rule of jurisdiction was the exact equivalent of Scotland's. Con-
ceivably then, foreign nullity decrees would be recognized where
the decreeing court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the hus-
band's domicile alone, irrespective of who is the petitioner.'68
C. Canada
When a foreign nullity decree is urged upon a Canadian court
for recognition, the court will recognize the decree if the jurisdic-
tion of the decreeing court coincides with the common law bases
of jurisdiction recognized in Canada. 6 Generally these bases in-
clude common domicile of the parties, residence of the respondent,
and celebration of the marriage.6 6 A further basis, domicile of the
petitioner, is accepted in some provinces. 1 6 When recognition is
in Indyka v. Indyka, [1967) 2 All E.R. 689 conceivably would not dictate a contrary re-
sult either.
160 Warden v. Warden, [1951) Sess. Cas. 508, 510-11.
161 In Travers the decree which was recognized had been rendered prior to enact-
ment of the statute which authorized English courts to assert jurisdiction on similar
grounds.
162 This interpretation, that the foreign court's rule be the "mirror image" of the
recognizing court, was rejected by Lord Wilberforce in Indyka v. Indyka, [1967) 2 All
E.R. 689, 727-28.
163 This assumes a void marriage. In Aldridge v. Aldridge, [1954) Sess. Cas. 58,
the husband was domiciled in Scotland and the wife, a domiciliary of England, sought
a decree rendering the Scottish marriage void because of bigamy. Jurisdiction was ex-
ercised and the decree granted. In Balshaw v. Kelly, [1967) Scots L.T. 5, jurisdiction
was asserted on the basis of the husband's domicile in Scotland where he was the peti-
tioner.
164 See, e.g., Capon v. McFay, [19651 2 Ont. 83. Appellant, in trying to obtain
her intestate share of decedent's (her former husband) estate, argued that a nullity
decree she obtained in Nevada was invalid because the Nevada court did not have proper
jurisdiction to make the declaration. To ascertain whether recognition was appropriate
the court hypothesized whether it could have asserted jurisdiction had it been in the
position of the Nevada court.
165-Castel, Canadian Private International Law Rules Relating to Domestic Relations,
5 McGILL L.J. 1, 12 (1958); Kennedy, Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Nullity
Decrees, 35 CAN. B. REV. 628, 648 (1957).
166 Findlay v. Boettner, [1948) 1 D.L.R. 39 (Alta.); Bevand v. Bevand, [1955) 1
D.L.R. 854 (N.S.). In Grower v. Starrett, [1948) 2 D.L.R. 853 (B.C.), there is dictum
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accorded, it is grounded upon an equation of the common law bases
of jurisdiction.'6 However, as noted in the discussion of Canadian
court's jurisdiction, the common law bases of jurisdiction have been
restricted to void marriages. Therefore, it might be the case that
the equation of common law bases will not be appropriate if a de-
cree annulling a voidable marriage is urged upon the court for rec-
ognition. The party urging recognition would be well advised to
be familiar with the Travers principle. 168
The Travers principle authorizes recognition if the foreign bases
of jurisdiction comports with local statutory extensions of the com-
mon law bases.'69 This principle has been extended to recognition
of foreign nullity decrees by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Capon
v. McFay.7 ° There the wife, after having the husband committed
to a mental institution in Ontario, established a bona fide domicile
in Nevada and eventually secured a decree declaring her marriage
void because of the husband's insanity at the time of the ceremony.
Upon the husband's death however, she sought to obtain her in-
testate share of his estate arguing that the Nevada decree was in-
valid because the court did not have proper jurisdiction over her.
The court concluded that it would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction
solely on the ground that the petitioner was domiciled in Ontario.
The learned judge felt that failure to recognize such a decree would
be "inconsistent and contrary" to the well recognized principle
enunciated in Travers.
Admittedly, the reference to Travers was unnecessary in Capon
because clearly the equation of common law bases of jurisdiction
to the effect that domicile of the petitioner is not sufficient. Hutchings v. Hutchings,
[1930] 4 D.L.R. 673 (Man. C.A.) held that it was not sufficient. In Ontario, presum-
ably Capon v. McFay, [1965] 2 Ont. 83 (C.A.) would control. There the court stated
that in its view.
the assumption of jurisidction by the English Courts in the case of a void mar-
riage is founded on sound reason, for if a void marriage is a complete nullity
and can be regarded in that light by every Court and by all persons, there can
be no valid reason for withholding recognition from a decree recording its non-
existence made by the forum of the country in which only one of the parties
is domiciled. To restrict jurisdictional recognition to the Courts of the coun-
try of the common domicile would result in the creation of an intolerable
situation in the case of a void marriage where the domicile of the parties, as
has been demonstrated, may be different. In such a case the problem of ju-
risdiction would be hopelessly insoluble, leading to the creation, as in the case
at bar, of a deplorable condition in which one of the parties would be regarded
as married in one country and unmarried in another. Id. at 95.
167 Castel, Comment, 43 CAN. B. REV. 647,659 (1965).
168 Mendes da Costa, The Canadian Divorce Law at 1968 and its Provisions on
Conflicts, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 214, 226 (1969), notes that it is not entirely clear to
what extent Travers will be accepted in the Canadian provinces.
169 Castel, supra note 167, at 658-59.
170 [1965] 2 Ont. 83 (C.A.).
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rendered recognition approprate.171 The lack of cases on the point
makes any statement regarding recognition of foreign nullity decrees
on the basis of the Travers principal purely conjectural. It is to be
noted that Canadian commentators have been urging the adoption
of this principle with respect to the recognition of foreign nullity
decrees for years.' 2 However, it has been noted that the Indyka v.
Indyka 75 expansion of Travers to the effect that the recognizing
court should look only to see if the party had "a real and substan-
tial" connection with the forum which asserted jurisdiction, will ren-
der the provisions of the Divorce Act 7 4 of diminished importance in
recognizing foreign divorce decrees.' 7 5  A fortiori the effect would
be the same in recognizing nullity decrees. Thus domicile of the pe-
titioner in the place of the decreeing court may not ultimately be
necessary.
D. Australia
For an Australian court to recognize a nullity decree of a foreign
country, the necessary bases upon which the foreign court must have
asserted jurisdiction are explicitly delineated by statute.178  These
bases are a mirror of those which enable Australian courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction. Where a voidable marriage is annulled, the de-
creeing court must be the place of the domicile of the petitioner. 7
A decree annulling a void marriage can be declared by the court
of domicile or residence of the petitioner. 7  Further, if a foreign
nullity decree was not based on the petitioner's domicile or residence,
and the law of the foreign country authorizes the assertion of juris-
diction on the basis of the respondent being domiciled there, then
171 This argument is made by Castel, supra note 167, at 659. The author further
points out that:
This is not to say that the new philosophy adopted by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in the field of recognition of foreign decrees in matrimonial causes
should be rejected altogether. Comity or rather reciprocity in appropriate
cases facilitates the recognition of foreign decrees based on jurisdictional
grounds similar to those upon which Ontario courts declare themselves com-
petent. Id.
172 Castel, supra note 165, at 12; Kennedy, "Reciprocity" in the Recognition of For-
eign judgments, 32 CAN. B. REv. 359, 368 (1954); cf. Lewis, Principle and Discretion
in the Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees, 12 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 298, 301 (1963);
20SGOODE HALL L.J. 266 (1961).
173[ 1967] 2 All E.R. 889 (H.L).
1 74 An Act Respecting Divorce 1968.
175 Mendes da Costa, Some Comments on the Conflict of Laws Provisions of the Di-
vorce Act, 1968, 46 CAN. B. REv. 252,289 (1968).
170 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 95.
1771d. § 95(2)(a).
178ld. § 95(2)(b).
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Australian courts are authorized to recognize the decree.' 79 A proviso
in the statute allows the court to deny recognition to a foreign de-
cree where, under the common law rules of private international law,
recognition would be denied because a party would be denied natural
justice. 8 This is consistent with the principle adopted by the En-
glish courts in Gray v. Formosa'8' and Lepre v. Lepre.'82
The statutory provisions for recognition of foreign decrees are
purportedly in addition to those already established under the com-
mon law rules of private international law.' 8" Presumably where a
foreign court has annulled a voidable marriage exercising jurisdic-
tion on the basis of common residency of the parties 84 or where a
court decrees a marriage void and the only basis for jurisdiction is
that the court is located at the place of celebration, these decrees
will be recognized by the courts of Australia. Recognition in the lat-
ter instance is easily justified if the decreeing court applied its own
law, the lex loci celebrationis, because even if the action were brought
before the Australian courts the same law would be applied and
hence the result would be the same.185  In the former situation,
recognition could only be obtained if the court were to acknowl-
edge that residuary jurisdiction is derived from the old ecclesiasti-
cal courts where residency of the respondent was sufficient.' 86
Whether this will be acceptable to Australian courts as a liberal
reading of section 95(7) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 is
unclear.
A further problem, not yet presented to the Australian courts,
is whether they will recognize the decree of a foreign court annul-
ling a voidable marriage where the decreeing court acknowledges
domicile to be equivalent to six weeks residence. 87 If the domicile
of the petitioner were the only basis for the foreign court's exercise
of jurisdiction, how likely would it be that an Australian court would
recognize the decree despite the apparent authorization in section
95(4) of the statute? To answer this question, a look to Australian
recognition of foreign divorce decrees is necessary.
179Id. § 95(4).
180 d. § 95(7).
181 [1963] P. 259 (C.A.).
182 [1965] P. 52.
183 p. JOSKE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 235 (4th ed. 1963, Supp. 1966); Matrimon-
ial Causes Act 1959, § 95(5).
184 E.g., Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax, [1956] P. 115.
185 See P. JOSKE, supra note 183, at 229.
186 See, e.g., Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax, [1956] P. 115.
187 The obvious reference is to the Dunne v. Saban, [1955] P. 178, situation, though
the periods of time involved are different.
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In Fenton v. Fenton 8 the Full Court of Victoria had occasion to
rule on the identical issue presented in the Travers decision, namely,
whether it should recognize the decree of a foreign court having
statutory jurisdiction similar to that granted the Victorian courts.
The Full Court rejected the Travers principle of reciprocity. 8 9 Re-
acting to the decision, the Victorian Parliament amended its statute
to expressly provide for recognition of a foreign decree where the
deserted wife was the petitioner.' 90 Presumably, section 95(4) of
the Commonwealth's Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 would abrogate
the Fenton holding to an even greater extent in that if the law of
the place where the decree is rendered considers it valid, then the
Australian courts should also.
In the hypothetical posed, conceivably recognition could be de-
nied under the principle of Indyka v. Indyka'9' because the wife
arguably did not have a "real and substantial" connection with the
forum. Such an approach would be possible under the statute which
does not prevent the application of common law principles.19 2 It
has been speculated that Australian courts are likely to invoke the
doctrine where the result would be nonrecognition and reject it if
expansion of recognition policies would obtain. 193
E. United States
No particular set of rules govern United States' courts recognition
of foreign nullity decrees. Contrary to Australia where a federal
statute determines recognition standards for the separate states,lH
in the United States, each state has its own rules of recognition.
Apart from the common law, no state is compelled to recognize any
foreign decree.'9" However, despite the inherent uncertainty in
such a system, certain general principles of recognition have evolved.
188 [1957] Vict. 11.
189The decision was severely criticized. 2 SIDNEY L. REv. 602 (1956-58); 17
FACULTY L. REv. U. TORONTO 146 (1959).
190 Marriage (Amendment) Act 1957, § 4. This legislation is discussed by Cowen,
Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees: Sectiorn 4 of the Victorian Marriage (Amend-
ment) Act, 1957, 32 AUSTL. L.J. 102 (1958).
191 [1967] 2 All E.R. 689.
192 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 95(5).
'93 See 1967 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 228-30 (1970).
194 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, § 95 (Austl.).
195 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 172 (rev. ed. of The Law of Conflict
of Laws 1968). The converse is also true - no state is compelled to deny recognition
from a foreign judgment. This is most vividly illustrated by the history of Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). In that case the Supreme Court upheld the denial of rec-
ognition to a foreign decree on the basis that similar judgment rendered by an American
court would not be afforded res judicata effect in the foreign court. This retaliation doc-
trine has never been accepted by American state courts. The states rejection of the doc-
1971]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 3: 176
Annulment decrees rendered in an American state are entitled
to recognition in sister states under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution.' This was conclusively established by the Su-
preme Court in Sutton v. Leib. 19 7  The full faith and credit clause
does not preclude a state from inquiring into the jurisdictional facts
upon which the foreign decree was founded.198  Thus the principle
of recognition in the United States, with respect to sister state judg-
ments, is equivalent to that of England: A decree will be recognized
if the decreeing court was competent, that is, it had jurisdiction.
The argument has been made that the same principle should be ap-
plied to foreign nullity decrees 9 and this argument appears to have
prevailed though case law on the matter is virtually non-existent."'
The Restatement urges that a valid judgment of a foreign coun-
try should be recognized if the decreeing court was competent and
had jurisdiction to act in the matter.201  A further restriction on the
recognition is that the defendant must have been notified of the ac-
tion and provided with a reasonable opportunity to be heard.2°2 Fi-
nally, the decreeing court must have complied with any require-
ments imposed upon it for the valid assertion of its power." 3
The Restatement approach, which represents the amalgamation
of cases dealing with judgments of foreign countries generally, ap-
pears to overcome many of the recognition problems which have
trine becomes binding on the federal courts because in most cases that arise the Erie
rule governs. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
196 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
197 342 U.S. 402 (1952). There the Court required Illinois to recognize a New
York decree but did not prevent the Illinois courts from deciding on collateral issues,
such as alimony owed by the husband.
198 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945).
199 Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. REV. 849, 872-73
(1959).
200 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, comment 8 at 371 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1967).
201Id. § 92(a) & (c).
202 Id. § (b). This principle is a clear manifestation of the United States' courts con-
cern with due process. In Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 296 (D.D.C. 1964),
the court felt
that in the interest of affording United States citizens a reasonable degree of
certainty as to when our own Courts will, under principles of comity, enforce a
judgment rendered against such citizens in foreign countries, the issue of
whether the foreign country had jurisdiction over the United States national
should be determined by our own standards of judicial power as promulgated
by the Supreme Court under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
This approach has been considered the better one, opposed to the more subjective test
sometimes utilized: whether or not the court liked the kind of service employed by the
rendering court. R. LEFLAR, supra note 195, at 172 n.7.
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 92(d) (Proposed Official Draft
1967).
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confronted the courts of the other countries considered, namely
those presented by the reciprocity principle of Travers. In addition,
the mechanical manner in which the Restatement approach can be
applied obviates the need to consider whether the parties had a "real
and substantial" connection with the forum, a test suggested in
Indyka. Arguably, if the decree is considered valid in the country
where rendered, nonrecognition of such judgments will not facilitate
the domestic relations of the parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above has been an attempt to answer the general question:
Given a particular set of circumstances, will the court exercise juris-
diction and pronounce a nullity decree? The discussion has at-
tempted to illustrate the various authorities which support the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in each instance. In addition, possible arguments
for the extension of present jurisdictional bases have been suggested.
The following table purports to illustrate the situations where juris-
diction questions arise and provide some indication as to whether
jurisdiction will be be asserted. "X" designates that jurisdiction will
be absolute, "Y" that some qualifications are involved such as the
petitioner must be the husband or various residence periods exist,
and "Z" indicates that jurisdiction has not as yet been asserted in the
situation, but that some possibility exists that the court will in the
future. A dash suggests that the exercise of jurisdiction is highly
unlikely.
VOID MARRIAGE
Forum England Scotland Canada Australia United States
Place of Celebration X Y Z - X
Common Domicile X X X X X
Respondent's Domicile Z X X X X
Petitioner's Domicile X X Z X X
Common Residence X Z X Y Y
Respondent's Residence X Z X Y Y
Petitioner's Residence Y Y Z Y Y
VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
Place of Celebration - - NA X
Common Domicile X Z NA Y X
Respondent's Domicile Y Z NA - X
Petitioner's Domicile Y Y NA Y X
Common Residence X - NA - Y
Respondent's Residence X - NA - Y
Petitioner's Residence Y Y NA - Y
The table clearly indicates a greater accessibility to the courts
when a void marriage is alleged. This is somewhat justifiable on
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the presumption that a void marriage needs no judicial decree to
render it a nullity. However, arguments can be made that identical
jurisdiction should obtain when a voidable marriage is alleged be-
cause the choice of law problem posed is no different than when a
void marriage is in issue. In both instances the decreeing court
must look elsewhere for the substantive law which it will apply. Pre-
sumably, the proper application of this law will result in a decree
which is universally recognized.
Nonrecognition of a nullity decree results in a "limping mar-
riage" - one recognized in one country and not in another. This
would likely be the consequence if just one country decided to ex-
pand the bases of jurisdiction over voidable marriage cases. How-
ever, recognition rules such as those propounded in Indyka and the
Restatement would tend to preclude the problem of these limping
marriages. Should any of the countries studied consider the expan-
sion of the bases of jurisdiction over voidable marriages, a corol-
lary consideration should be a similar expansion of the rules for rec-
ognition of foreign nullity decrees.
DONALD J. NEWMAN
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